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Russia’s grip on the Central Asia-Center pipeline seemed to have ensured its control 
over Central Asian natural gas exports during the post-Soviet era. In recent months, that 
dominance has begun to erode with the opening of two new export routes: one linking 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to China and another one linking 
Turkmenistan to Iran. The development of these new routes are said to have caused a 
“tectonic shift” in economic and political relations in the Central Asian region.
The Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan sit atop 
enormous natural gas deposits: Turkmenistan, with 2.7 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of 
natural gas reserves, is thought to hold the world’s twelfth largest proven reserves, 
although regularly announced discoveries of new gas fields suggest that the country 
may in fact hold greater reserves of natural gas than has yet been proven; Kazakhstan, 
with 2.4 tcm, has the world’s thirteenth largest reserves; and Uzbekistan, with 1.8 tcm, 
has the world’s eighteenth largest reserves of natural gas. (1) In an era marked by 
increased concerns over greenhouse gas emissions and the rising cost of oil, economic 
forecasts point to a dramatic rise in global demand for natural gas by which the 
hydrocarbon-rich Central Asian states stand to reap handsome profits. (2) But, for the 
most part, the promise of wealth flowing into the region has failed to materialize during 
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the decades following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaving the states of 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as paupers sitting on a golden throne.
The constraints responsible for the limited level of development in the region’s energy 
sector can be measured in millimeters: 1,020 – 1,420 millimeters, to be precise. (3) That 
measure is the average diameter of the Central Asia-Center (CAC) natural gas pipeline, 
the principal corridor for Turkmen and Uzbek gas deliveries to the Russian market 
downstream. The CAC network is a Soviet industry holdover, constructed in stages 
across Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan from 1960 to 1988; today it remains 
under Russian control exercised by the state’s gas export monopoly, Gazprom. At one 
time, the system’s total carrying capacity was estimated at 90 billion cubic meters (bcm) 
per year, though by 2009, volumes had dropped to about 44 bcm. (4) The export 
bottleneck is due, in large part, to the decrepit state of repair into which the transmission 
system has fallen during the post-Soviet era.
The CAC has served as an invaluable tool for Gazprom, allowing Russia to retain its 
dominant position in the region as the gatekeeper for Central Asian gas exports. 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rely on the CAC transmission system to move over 70 
percent of their annual export volumes, which must pass through Russia en route to 
foreign markets. Gazprom has used its ownership of the pipeline to secure favorable 
terms in negotiations for Central Asian gas supplies, which in turn can be sold at a profit 
to markets further downstream. Russia has come to rely upon the ready availability of 
cheap Central Asian fuel supplies to meet its domestic energy needs, as its own levels 
of natural gas production have been diverted to lucrative European markets, or have 
dropped off in exhausted Siberian fields. If such supply arrangements struck Central 
Asian governments and downstream consumers as predatory, there was little they could 
do about it as long as Gazprom retained exclusive control of the region’s pipelines.
Despite evidence that the CAC has been suffering from chronic structural neglect during 
the past two decades, Gazprom and the Russian government have jealously guarded 
the CAC against would-be challengers. Primary among these challengers to Russian 
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regional hegemony were EU and US-backed energy majors seeking a route to Central 
Asian energy supplies that would bypass Russia. One scheme that seemed to gain 
traction for a time was the Nabucco pipeline, which would provide a vital supply line 
linking Central Asian gas fields directly to European markets downstream. However, this 
plan was fraught with problems from the beginning due to an array of factors, some 
having to do with the region’s tumultuous geopolitics. Conflict in Afghanistan threatened 
the security of gas field developments in southern Turkmenistan. Iran’s nuclear program 
and the attendant threat of international sanctions made Western companies wary of 
charting the pipeline’s path through that country, meaning that an important corridor 
must remain off limits to the Nabucco partners. Domestic politics in Central Asian 
countries also complicated the picture, with governments disinclined to seek Western 
support proffered with strings attached. Regardless of the hurdles standing in the way of 
an independent pipeline to Central Asia, Western plans were sufficiently plausible to set 
off alarms in Moscow.
Gazprom responded to what it perceived as a threat to its regional dominance with 
extreme measures, contracting to buy between 70 to 80 bcm of Turkmen gas annually 
at European market prices, which then averaged around $350 per thousand cubic 
meters (tcm). Moreover, the Russian company promised to expand the capacity of the 
CAC network, and to update its aging infrastructure. Problems arose soon after the deal 
was struck, when the floor dropped out from under the global gas market in 2008, and 
Russia was unable to resell its gas surplus on stagnant European markets. For over a 
year Russia was forced to buy Turkmen gas volumes at a loss. Then, in April 2009, an 
explosion along a branch of the CAC pipeline brought gas flows from Turkmenistan to a 
halt. The incident was decried by Turkmen authorities, who viewed the explosion as 
sabotage orchestrated by Gazprom at the very moment that the company had decided 
to default on its import commitments, and who claimed that the reduction in exports cost 
Turkmenistan $1 billion per month in lost revenues. (5)
Gazprom was still laboring to come to a new supply arrangement with Ashgabat on 
December 14, 2009, when the presidents of China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and 
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Uzbekistan met to inaugurate the Central Asia–China gas pipeline in Turkmenistan. In 
keeping with the grand scale of operations characteristic of Chinese endeavors, the new 
pipeline is said to be the world’s longest, stretching from Turkmen gas fields on the 
shore of the Caspian Sea, through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and then on to China’s 
western Xinjiang province 1,833 kilometers away. There, it links up with the Chinese 
West-East gas transmission system that runs 4,500 kilometers across the country, 
supplying Central Asian gas to Shanghai and Hong Kong. (6) In 2010, the pipeline will 
carry an anticipated load of thirteen bcm of Turkmen gas, volumes that are expected to 
increase to thirty bcm the following year, and to more than forty bcm by 2013, an 
estimate that represents over half of China’s current level of consumption, and 
approaches Turkmenistan’s export levels of 2008, totaling forty seven bcm. (7) 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, host countries to the pipeline, may someday feed natural 
gas volumes from their national production into the Chinese supply network.
The pipeline is the result of enormous geostrategic initiatives that China is presently in a 
unique position to realize. The project, estimated to cost around $8 billion, was financed 
in large part by the China Development Bank, which laid out $6.7 billion for the 1,115 
kilometer portion of the pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan. (8) In the Central Asian 
partner states, the China National Petroleum Corporation bought up large shares of 
Kazakhstan’s energy companies MangistauMunaiGas and KazMunaiGas Exploration & 
Production, and obtained rights to exploit Turkmenistan’s eastern South Yolotan gas 
field. (9) At the opening ceremony, China was congratulated for successfully uniting the 
Central Asian states by Turkmen President Berdymuhammedov, who hailed Chinese 
efforts in terms as grandiose as the project itself: “a prototype for all international energy 
partnerships,” and he predicted that history would prove it to be “a major contributing 
factor to security in Asia.” (10)
The launch of the Central Asia-China pipeline was followed by a second inauguration 
that, although not so dramatic in terms of length or capacity, nonetheless signals a 
sustained drive to branch out from Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence in post-Soviet 
geopolitics. In January of this year, Iran and Turkmenistan celebrated the opening of a 
4
pipeline linking Turkmenistan’s southeast Dauletabad gas field to the Khangiran gas 
refinery about thirty kilometers away in northern Iran. The Dauletabad-Sarakhs-
Khangiran pipeline initially will carry six bcm of gas per year, eventually bringing 
Turkmen exports up to about twenty bcm per year. (9) The new branch will supplement 
the two hundred kilometer Korpedzhe to Kurt-Kui pipeline, which has been carrying 
about six to eight bcm of Turkmen gas per year since 1997. (10) Until the Central Asia-
China pipeline opened late last year, the Korpedzhe to Kurt-Kui pipeline represented 
Turkmenistan’s only export route not under Russian control. The modest new pipeline 
was hailed as a historic pact of friendship among neighbors at the opening ceremony, 
where Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad promised that it would take relations 
between the two states to a new level, and Turkmen President Gurbanguly 
Berdymuhammedov, spoke of its “major international significance,” calling it “an answer 
to the problem of energy security.” (11) Although the Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran 
pipeline is far too limited to satisfy Iran’s desire to be a major regional player in Central 
Asia, it has provided Iran with the opportunity to reach out to a regional partner at a 
perilous moment in its history and has given Turkmenistan a second impetus in its drive 
for export diversification. The new pipeline linking the two neighbors comes at a time 
when gas flows are expanding, but perhaps not in the direction favored by Western 
governments. The fact that Turkmenistan went ahead and welcomed the new route 
indicates that Berdymuhammedov’s government is interested less in attracting Western 
support and investment than in developing the economic ties that come to hand.
Reactions in Moscow to the new developments in Russia’s former backyard have been 
muted. Analysts downplayed the political significance of the altered economic 
landscape, noting that Gazprom is sticking by its long-term strategy of blocking Western 
plans for a non-Russian pipeline to prevent Central Asian gas from flowing to its 
European customers downstream. (12) Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
acknowledged the opening of the new energy route between Central Asia and China, 
but said only, “We know China's gas demand ... and do not think the Turkmenistan-
China gas pipeline could undermine [our plans],” referring to a natural gas supply 
agreement between Russia and China that has been sputtering toward viability over the 
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last five years. (13) In fact, at the time of the Central Asia-China pipeline’s inauguration, 
officials in Moscow were in no position to oppose Central Asian gas exports to China, 
with Gazprom refusing to honor its 2008 commitment to buy up to 80 bcm of Turkmen 
gas per year at European prices. (14) When Gazprom finally agreed to begin accepting 
gas imports from Turkmenistan the following month, it limited its total volume 
commitment to 30 bcm per year, and demanded a significant discount. (15) Even if 
Russian officials had objected, their complaints would have had little effect unless 
backed up by a more attractive offer than they have been able to make thus far. Faced 
with the current slump in world market prices and demand for natural gas, Russia is no 
longer the most favored partner in the region.
The inauguration of the new natural gas pipelines is a development of geopolitical 
import. For coming years, it portends an economic and political shift in favor of the three 
Central Asian countries, China and Iran, to the detriment of Russian and, possibly, 
Western interests in the region. Russia will no longer enjoy a monopolist’s hold over the 
region’s energy markets. This is a turn of events for which Western governments have 
long contended, but ultimately it may not work to their benefit, as the increased 
influence of China and Iran in Central Asia marks a corresponding diminishment of 
Western leverage there. It is doubtful that Turkmenistan, in particular, will be as 
receptive to Western overtures that come freighted with demands for democratic 
reforms now that the government in Ashgabat has wealthy economic partners that show 
blithe indifference to its unsavory methods of domestic governance. Certainly, 
Turkmenistan’s participation in future negotiations concerning the feasibility of Nabucco 
are unlikely to come garlanded with promises of free elections. Moreover, Western 
governments must now contend with Turkmenistan’s fresh wellspring of neighborly 
goodwill that likely will complicate efforts to isolate Iran through sanctions. In fact, the 
Dauletabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran pipeline may open a corridor for Turkmen gas through 
Iran to the Persian Gulf, a development that would not be cheered by consumers in the 
West. At the start of a new decade in Central Asia, Iran has secured a regional ally; 
China has secured a long-term energy supply chain; Russian interests are diminished 
and Western interests grow increasingly irrelevant. The states of Turkmenistan, 
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have shifted toward economic independence from Russia, 
and thereby attained a degree of regional stability and security.
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